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PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL IN THE NEW 
CENTURY:  ARE UNIVERSITIES PREPARED? 
In recent years, intellectual property has become increasingly important 
to academic institutions throughout the United States.  As universities 
rely more heavily on trademarks and patents for additional revenue, 
questions arise as to whether these institutions are sufficiently protected 
by their current intellectual property policies.  This iBrief explores the 
policies promulgated by a variety of academic institutions and assesses 
whether these universities are adequately protected by their policies. 
Academia is both an industry with marked similarities to many in the private sector and 
an institution uniquely charged with the discovery and promulgation of knowledge in our society.  
In both those guises, universities produce valuable patents, copyrights and other intellectual 
capital.  From a strategic policy standpoint, important questions arise, both for these institutions 
and their corporate partners.  Are intellectual property interests protected by the presence of valid 
university intellectual property policies, or is there cause for concern?  In an effort to answer this 
question, this iBrief examines university policies for the purpose of determining which academic 
institutions, private or public—in the aggregate—are more likely to maintain protective policies.  
We conclude that disturbingly few institutions have promulgated intellectual property policies.  
Thus, there is cause for legitimate concern that financial investment in research is likely in many 
cases not to be protected.  Industries funding academic research may need to review the scope 
and extent of their own contracts with academia as well as reconsider their associations with 
institutions that fail to maintain or implement protective intellectual property policies.  
Establishing the Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty, a seminal employment law concept, is based on the “servant’s” 
traditional common-law duty of loyalty to the “master.”  Today, loyalty is often embodied in 
various forms of non-competition agreements, under which the employee expressly agrees to 
refrain from competing against or misappropriating the proprietary knowledge of the employer.  
American courts often will enforce such promises, if properly supported by legal consideration 
flowing to the servant.1    
                                                     
1 See, e.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kosan, 582 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Pa. 1984); George W. 
Kistler, Inc. v. O’Brien, 464 Pa. 475 (Pa. 1975). 
In some states, legislatures have seen fit to capture, or revise, the common law loyalty 
rules in statutes.2  Non-competition policies, however, are usually embodied in an employment 
contract or employment policy.  Non-competition clauses, as well as patent, inventions and trade 
secret rules of all sorts within contracts and policies have become standard within corporate 
industry.  There exists no wide-ranging study of these strategic employment policies among 
academic institutions, which as an industry like many of those in the private sector also produces 
valuable patents, copyrights and other intellectual property.  The growth of the “research for sale” 
industry by way of corporate-university partnerships begs the question:  at these public and 
private institutions of higher learning, who owns what?  Are corporate interests protected by the 
presence of valid university intellectual property policies, or should corporations be concerned? 
Assessing the Policies – Our Methodology 
The Faculty Appointment Policy Archive,3 a database of 241 randomly selected university 
employment policies or collective bargaining agreements compiled by the Harvard Graduate 
School of Education, serves as the foundation from which we are able to comparatively examine 
public and private academic institutional employment policies or agreements related to trade 
secrets, patents, inventions, trademarks, and copyrights.  Unlike the for-profit sector of the 
economy, the tradition in higher education has been that faculty own their own creative and 
written works.  The exception has been in the area of patents and inventions, over which 
institutions have held tighter control. 
An initial review of the data found loyalty policies to be general clauses of dependability 
and reliability.  Further, copyright policies were primarily related to a researcher’s adherence to 
copyright laws as they relate to the duplication of class materials for distribution and to the 
ownership of written works.  Similarly, of the fourteen trademark policies found, half are related 
to the use of university logos and similar design, with the remaining related to intellectual 
property protection. 
While we present a frequency analysis for each of these polices from the sample, we also 
delve deeper into those intellectual property policies, patent and inventions policies, which are 
more likely to hold corporate intellectual property interests.  Clearly, the debate surrounding 
copyright issues and the ownership of online course material is sufficient to warrant a separate 
article.  Rather, our analysis focuses on patent and invention policies.  Following an assessment 
                                                     
2 See, e.g., 5 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1994); 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2707 
(1993). 
3 Harvard Graduate School of Education, FACULTY APPOINTMENT POLICY ARCHIVE (CD-ROM, 
1999). 
of present and past trends as well as an in-depth legal analysis, we conduct CHI-Squared analysis4 
testing to determine whether the university’s public or private status is independent to the 
existence of these intellectual property policies. 
We offer the following hypotheses: 
Test: 1 
H0:  The public or private university status is independent of the existence of patent 
policies. 
H1:  The public or private university status is not independent of the existence of patent 
policies. 
Test: 2 
H0:  The public or private university status is independent of the existence of invention 
policies. 
H1:  The public or private university status is not independent of the existence of 
 invention policies. 
 
Industry’s contributions to academia are approaching $2 billion per year, representing a 
ten-time multiple of 1979 rates.5  It would seem logical that private institutions, motivated by 
funding opportunities, have a greater stake in the development of new patents and other forms of 
valuable intellectual property and thus have promulgated intellectual property right policies more 
so than public institutions.  From our CHI-Squared and frequency analysis we can determine 
whether these intellectual property right policies are more prevalent at public or private 
institutions. 
The Present Condition 
Academics and corporate America have in the past maintained a symbiotic relationship, 
in that corporate funding or venture capital is expected, provided and received in exchange for 
equity in research findings and developments.  “According to the National Science Foundation, 
corporate funding of academic labs has more than doubled over ten years, to close to $2 billion in 
                                                     
4 The chi-square test measures the degree to which a theoretical frequency distribution 
corresponds to a frequency distribution of observed data.  In this study, the authors theorized that, 
because historically private (especially private research or so-called “R-1”) universities have 
relied more heavily upon research grants and other privately-funded R&D than their public sector 
counterparts, these private institutions would be better protected by adequate patent and other 
intellectual property policies. 
1997.”6  This has clearly been disturbing to some in academia who argue that universities should 
be pursuing research for the sake of developing a body of knowledge in various disciplines rather 
than collaborating with private industry.7  Despite cries for an “untainted” academic environment, 
corporate/university yearning for collaboration was clearly displayed by the 1998 landmark deal 
between Novartis and the University of California, Berkeley.  Novartis, the Swiss biotechnology 
and agrochemical institute is providing $25 million over five years in addition to access to 
proprietary technology and DNA databases to UC Berkeley’s Department of Plant & Microbial 
Biology in the College of Natural Resources.  In return, Novartis will receive first rights to 
negotiate for roughly thirty to forty percent of the discoveries made in the department.8 
Funding sources and successes are plentiful, according to a 1999 survey by the 
Association of University Technology Managers.  Including research agreements aimed at 
achieving scientific breakthroughs and contracts for the development of distance learning course 
materials, universities and colleges amassed more than $576 million in royalties from inventions 
licensed to industry in fiscal 1998 and were awarded more than 2681 patents.  The surveyed 
institutions also reported forming 279 start-up companies based on inventions by their faculty or 
graduate students.9 
Past Trends 
Many university/corporate resource agreements were developed during the 1980s in order 
to offset revenue shortfalls in more traditional categories of college revenue.  Tuition increases 
made it difficult for parents to be full-payers and institutions often made deep discounts on their 
“sticker prices.”  Federal research funding diminished.  Meanwhile, rising overhead costs 
outpaced institutions’ ability to fund faculty research on their own.  While universities were 
struggling to meet costs, corporate America shared similar economic difficulties.10  Downsizing 
became common, even popular in corporate boardrooms, as companies reduced and eliminated 
unprofitable units and functions – among them research and development departments.  
Corporate realization that R&D was intrinsic, indeed critical, to future industrial growth initiated 
a search for alternative production outlets. 
                                                                                                                                                              
5 Robert Buderi, From the Ivory Tower to the Bottom Line, 103 TECH. REV. 4, at 82-86. 
6 Zinea Moukheiber, Science for Sale, FORBES, May 17, 1999, at 137. 
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During the same period, the passage of the Government Patent Policy Act,11 which 
became effective in July 1981, ended years of confusion over the ownership and 
commercialization of government sponsored research.  Until that time, the ownership and 
commercialization of government-sponsored research was governed by twenty-six separate 
federal agency regulations.  Specifically, this Act “established a presumption that ownership of 
all patent rights in federally funded research would vest in any contractor qualifying as a 
nonprofit research institution or small business.”12  These federal policy changes led corporate 
R&D managers increasingly to approach research-producing universities that could help meet 
industry demand for growth and innovation.  Determining that there would be mutual economic 
benefit, university administrators embraced the joint venture concept.13 
Companies funding academic research were afforded exclusive rights to that research.  
Information that typically flowed freely now only flowed to one source, the company.  Caught 
between the university’s need for resources and the company’s need for secrecy often 
compromised an academic’s ethical posture.14  Companies asserted control by insisting that 
funding would only be available in return for research secrecy and exclusive rights to the 
intellectual property produced.  Enticed by the moneymaking opportunity, both universities and 
their faculty relinquished ownership rights and in doing so, their rights to an open exchange of 
knowledge and information. 
Legal Perspective 
Unless there exists a clear and unambiguous contract or policy, as is often found in 
corporate/academic partnerships, determining ownership of intellectual property within an 
academic environment is clearly an arduous task.  There are few reported cases that address 
whether the educational institution or the faculty member owns the property created by the 
faculty member.15  In environments other than academia, it has long been established that the 
employer owns property created by an employee.  This is stipulated under the “work made for 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 M.M. Scott, Intellectual Property Rights: A Ticking Time Bomb in Academia, 84 ACADEME 3, 
at 22-26. 
11 Government Patent Policy Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. § 200-212 (2001). 
12 K.W. Heathington et al., Commercializing Intellectual Properties at Major Research 
Universities: Income Distribution, 17 J. RES. ADMIN. 4, at 27-39. 
13 Scott, supra note 10. 
14 Id. 
15 Georgia Holmes et al., Who Owns Course Materials Prepared by a Teacher or Professor?  The 
Application of Copyright Law to Teaching Materials in the Internet Age, 2000 BYU EDUC. & 
L.J. 165 (1999). 
hire” section of the Copyright Act of 1976.16  Conversely, faculty members, under the principle of 
academic freedom, are typically allowed to own the property they created.17  In the past, 
administrators have left copyright issues unchallenged because the value of most copyrighted 
material was insignificant.  However, with the advent of web-based and related multimedia 
software, universities are re-evaluating their stance on ownership of copyrighted intellectual 
property.18 
Another significant factor causing universities to re-think their views is the 
commercialization of intellectual property.  It is the hope of colleges and universities that 
commercializing intellectual property will help increase revenue to support further research.  
Commercialization also raises new issues of third party involvement, especially when large 
corporations are among the players.  The concern is that corporations do not have the same 
commitment to research for academic advancement as universities.  As a result, their involvement 
may hinder the researcher’s ability to publicize new information.19 
Copyrights 
Fair use is yet another issue affecting intellectual property rights and is a statutory 
defense to copyright infringement.  The Copyright Act of 1976 establishes that certain uses of 
copyrighted works may be considered fair “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”20  
There are four factors courts consider when determining fair use of copyrighted material:  (1) 
whether the nature of the use is for commercial or educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work itself; (3) how substantial the portion used is relevant to the entire work; and 
(4) what effect did the use have on the potential market value of the copyrighted work.21 
The United States Constitution establishes that Congress shall have power “To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries.”22  This assertion permits 
Congress to grant a copyright to a person creating original literary, musical and artistic work.23 
                                                     
16 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2001). 
17 Fred H. Cate et al., Copyright Issues in Colleges and Universities, 84 ACADEME 3, at 39-45. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001). 
21 Cate et al., supra note 17. 
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8. 
23 Holmes et al., supra note 15. 
The “work made for hire” rule serves as an exception.  In Weinstein v. University of Illinois,24 a 
professor of pharmacy brought suit against his co-author, university administrators and the 
university alleging they published his article placing his name as the last author rather than as first 
author.  By this action, the university deprived him of his property with out due process.25  
Weinstein received two negative evaluations and was given a terminal contract from the 
University of Illinois due to his failure to publish during his employment.26  The federal district 
court found against Weinstein citing that the university owned the rights to the article, as it was a 
work for hire.27 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the 1976 Act 
broad enough to make all academic articles a “work for hire.”28  The court further stipulated that 
the “work for hire” policy applied more to administrative reports than academic journal articles.29  
If the Dean of the College of Pharmacy sought to make the Weinstein article a work for hire, he 
would have had to attain an affidavit declaring that professors routinely ask for consent before 
they publish articles.30  Further, any co-authors would have had to gain consent from the 
university before publishing.31  The Dean instructed Weinstein to publish but did not insist he 
gain the permission of the university to do so.32  Since faculty owned the copyrights to their 
articles, the court further ruled that the dispute between Weinstein and his co-author was a 
contractual dispute governed by state law.33 
Patents 
In Chou v. University of Chicago, a patent rights case, researcher Dr. Joany Chou sued 
the university for the patent on research she conducted involving the alteration of DNA to change 
a virus from virulent to avirulent.34  After Chou resigned, her advisor Dr. Bernard Roizman, 
chairman of the university’s Department of Molecular Genetics applied for three patents pertinent 
to the research.35  Chou’s name was listed on only one of the patents.36  Consequently, she filed a 
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complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois asserting that she 
was the inventor of all three patents but did not receive the financial benefits to which she was 
entitled.37  Chou sought to be declared sole or joint inventor on one of the patents, and joint 
inventor on the other two.38  The court dismissed two of the three claims, stating that as part of 
her employment with the university, she relinquished her rights and interests in the patents.39  The 
court reasoned that Chou can dispute the rights to ownership of the diagrams, drawings, writings 
and documentation she created during her employment40 but later dismissed her claim, with 
prejudice, determining that the chances of there being conversion and any significant damages 
were practically nil.41 
Although it is true that most universities are prepared to let their professors enjoy the 
insignificant rewards of publishing an article, they have recently been formulating policies that 
assert their joint or full ownership over property that is created with the use of university 
materials or facilities.42  Most researchers use university office supplies, computers, books from 
the university library, a secretary employed by the university or a research assistant.  Universities 
have wavered on enforcing these rights for two reasons:  first, to avoid conflict with their faculty 
members and second, there was uncertainty about whether or not these policies were legally 
enforceable.43 
On July 3, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision in Chou on several key issues.44  The threshold and most significant issue 
— one characterized by the appellate panel as being of first impression in U.S. patent law — was 
“whether a putative inventor who is obligated to assign her invention to another is entitled to sue 
for correction of ownership.”45  The court answered this novel question in the affirmative, 
recognizing that a university’s published patent policies could form an implied contract with an 
employee, such as a researcher or faculty member.46  Thus, although Chou had never actually 
signed an express contract assigning the rights to any patentable inventions she developed, the 
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facts that (1) her employment letter referenced the “administrative policies of the University,” and 
(2) these policies included the university’s patent policy, together satisfied the Seventh Circuit.  
The court then proceeded to find that, despite this assignment by implied contract, Chou retained 
interests as an inventor, which gave her standing to sue for correction of the patents to include her 
name.47 
One such interest is her reputation.  “Chou argues that a reputational interest alone is 
enough to satisfy the requirements of ... standing.  That assertion is not implausible.  After all, 
being considered an inventor of important subject matter is a mark of success in one’s field, 
comparable to being an author of an important scientific paper.”48  But beyond this reputational 
interest, the court found that as an inventor Chou is entitled to a share in gross royalties and up-
front licensing fees, if any.49 
What can one conclude?  The good news for universities and the corporations that partner 
with them is that “[a]side from ... relatively minor qualifications, employers have broad powers 
— consistently upheld by the courts — to claim employee inventions by contract,” and 
universities qua employers of faculty and research associates are no exception.50  On the other 
hand, universities will be held to their published policies and will be required to give a share of 
royalties and license fees to all those research team-members found to be substantive contributors 
to the invention.  Neither courts nor arbitrators will look kindly upon insider agreements that aim 
at cutting out low echelon team members from the fruits of the collective labors.  University 
researchers, even “lowly” research assistants and post-docs, are well-advised to consult legal 
counsel prior to executing employment contracts, non-competition agreements, assignments of 
rights, or even acknowledgments of their receipt of and commitment to review employment 
policies. 
Policy Review & Results 
The Harvard Graduate School of Education, Faculty Appointment Policy Archive, 
provided a sample of 241 randomly selected university employment policies or collective 
bargaining agreements from a population of 1380 U.S. four-year institutions ranging across the 
Carnegie classifications.  Surprisingly, considering the vast amount of valuable research produced 
at academic institutions, the results of our frequency analysis depict a low occurrence of 
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intellectual property rights policies, each at or below twenty percent of the sample.  From Test 1, 
the estimated CHI – Square statistic was 5.2186 with a P-value of 0.0223.  The critical value for 
this test is 3.8418.  The null hypothesis is rejected. In test 2 results, the estimated CHI – Square 
statistic was 5.1979 with a P-value of 0.0226.  The critical value for this test is 3.8418.  The null 
hypothesis is also rejected.  What this means, in layman's terms, is that (1) the majority of 
universities which responded to the survey either had no such policies or policies which were 
clearly inadequate, and (2) these statistics are reliable predictors of the state of affairs across 
higher education as whole. 
Based on a sample of universities, it is also evident that public or private status is a 
predictor of the existence of patent policies.  From our frequency and CHI-Squared analysis, we 
can predict that patent and invention policies are more prevalent at public than private 
institutions.  This finding contradicts our previously stated hypothesis that private institutions, 
seeking income through the development of valuable patents and other intellectual property, 
would have promulgated intellectual property policies more so than public institutions.  It 
suggests to us that in the increasingly competitive environment of higher education, public 
universities are emulating their private-sector counterparts in questing for corporate research 
dollars, presumably to compensate for the stinginess and (during the past two years) impecunious 
positions of many state treasuries. 
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